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I. INTRODUCTION
The West Virginia Human Rights Act declares that equal op-
portunity should be the civil right of every citizen of West Virginia,
regardless of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, age,
blindness or handicap.' Equal opportunity is founded upon the in-
herent right of all people to the "means of acquiring and possessing
property" 2 guaranteed by the West Virginia Constitution. "The Hu-
man Rights Act breathes life into these constitutional provisions which
mandate equal opportunity . . . . " The Act was adopted in 1967;
handicap was added to the list of traits when the Act was amended
in 1981. 4
However well-intentioned, handicapped rights legislation is not
necessarily working to protect those rights in the area of employ-
ment. While the goals of legislators have been loftily stated, the
1. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (1987).
2. W. Va. Const. art. III, § 1.
3. Allen v. State Human Rights Commission, 324 S.E.2d 99, 109 (W. Va. 1984).
4. 1981 W. Va. Acts, ch. 128.
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courts have often been reluctant to apply these laws in a way which
achieves the goal of equal opportunity found in both the Federal
Rehabilitation Act and in many state statutes.5 Federal and state
courts are divided between favoring employee rights or eschewing
employer burdens; courts either favor the employee by shifting the
burden of proof to the employer once a prima facie case of dis-
crimination is established, or favor the employer by allowing any
showing of unreasonableness of the proposed accommodation to
overcome the employer's duty to accommodate the handicapped em-
ployee. 6
In Coffman v. Board of Regents7 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals gave its first interpretation of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act as it applies to handicapped employment dis-
crimination. This comment examines that decision and the standard
to be applied in handicapped employment discrimination cases.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case originated in Monongalia County Circuit Court. The
plaintiff, Dorothy Coffman, was employed by West Virginia Uni-
versity Hospital as a Custodian 1.8 She injured her back in October
1980 while emptying garbage cans at the hospital. Over the following
months Coffman suffered from back pain sufficient to interfere with
her ability to perform her duties at work.9 Coffman did not work
the month of July 1981, during which time she received temporary
5. Note, After Carr: Rehabilitating the Michigan Handicappers' Statute, 33 WAYNE L. REv.
1133, 1135-38 (1987). This article divides states' handicapped rights statutes into four categories: those
similar to Alabama's which consists of a general declaration against discrimination and provides for
no cause of action; those similar to Michigan's which declares freedom to work without discrimination,
but provides protection only if the handicap is unrelated to job performance; those similar to Con-
necticut's which bifurcates handicap and ability to perform, allowing the employer to exclude only
if it is a bona fide occupational qualification; and the California group, which gives the clearest
definition of handicap, places a duty on the employer to accommodate, and allows exceptions for
bona fide occupational qualifications, undue hardship, and safety concerns.
6. Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness HARv. L. REv. 997 (1984).
7. Coffman v. W. Va. Board of Regents, No. 17904, slip op. (,V. Va. June 2, 1988).
8. Custodian I is a generic job description utilized not only at WVU Hospital but throughout
the university. Coffman, No. 17904 at 7 (Miller, J., dissenting) (The dissenting opinion at the slip
opinion is paginated separately and begins with 1).
9. Id. at 1.
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total disability benefits from Workers' Compensation. 10 She returned
to work in August 1981 but continued to suffer from back pain.
Coffman was assigned to do "high work," consisting of such duties
as cleaning windows and dusting, in a unit position with another
custodian doing the "low work" such as floors and garbage." In
a letter dated January 14, 1982, Coffman's supervisor notified her
that she would be terminated on January 25, 1982, unless another
position was found for her. No position was available, and Coffman
was discharged on January 25, 1982.12
Coffman filed a complaint on January 24, 1984, in the circuit
court of Monongalia County charging that she had been wrongfully
discharged in violation of the handicapped rights provision of the
Human Rights Act, chapter 5, article 11, section 9 of the West
Virginia Code (hereinafter W. Va. Code). The case was tried before
a jury in November 1986; the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Coffman and awarded her $55,600 in damages. 3
The West Virginia Board of Regents (Regents) appealed and ar-
gued that the trial court erred in submitting the question of rea-
sonable accommodation to the jury because Coffman was not a
qualified handicapped person. 14 The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals (Court of Appeals) rejected this argument, but held in
favor of the Regents. The court stated that reasonable accommo-
dation does not include a duty to "create a new position" or to
transfer, and reversed the trial court for ruling otherwise. 15
III. PRIOR LAW
Because Coffman is the first interpretation of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, there is no prior West Virginia case law. Instead,
the Supreme Court of Appeals relied on the similarity of the West
Virginia Human Rights Act and the Federal Rehabilitation Act 16 to
decide this case.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3-4.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 8.
1989]
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The civil rights of handicapped persons were first addressed by
Congress in 1973 when it passed the Federal Rehabilitation Act. 7
This was nine years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and a year
after Congress addressed sex discrimination in Title IX (1972). In
modeling the Federal Rehabilitation Act after the Civil Rights Act,
Congress intended to prevent discrimination against and to extend
equal opportunity to handicapped persons as a protected class. 18 The
Rehabilitation Act governs employment by the federal government,
hiring by federal contractors, and treatment in federally funded pro-
grams, as well as accessibility of public places. 19
The West Virginia Human Rights Act extends this protection of
equal opportunity to all handicapped citizens of West Virginia. The
Act provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice
...[flor any employer to discriminate against an individual with
respect to . . .employment if the individual is able and competent
to perform the services required even if such individual is blind or
handicapped. °20 Thus, the West Virginia Human Rights Act adds
a bona fide occupational qualification exemption which is absent in
the Federal Rehabilitation Act. 21 The state regulations promulgated
by the Human Rights Commission to implement the handicap pro-
visions of the Act became effective August 1, 1982.22 These regu-
lations define "handicap" and impose a duty to provide reasonable
accommodation on the employer.23
The definitional language of the federal and West Virginia en-
acting legislation is virtually identical. A handicap is defined as "any
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of a person's major life activities," which includes employment. 24
A "qualified handicapped person" is "one who is able and com-
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1982).
18. Comment, The Discrimination Statutes and the Supreme Court's "Program"for Confusion:
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrons; Grove City College v. Bell; North Haven Board of Education
v. Bell, 17 CoNN. L. REv. 629, 633-34 nn.16 & 19 (1985).
19. M. BraowiTz & M. HImL, DIsAnrimy AND THE LABOR MARKET, 501-04 (1986).
20. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (1987).
21. Id.
22. Coffman, No. 17904 at 4 n.4.
23. 77 C.S.R. I §§ 4.2, 4.3(a) (1987).
24. 77 C.S.R. 1 §§ 3, 2.1 (1987); see also 45 C.F.R. 84.30) (1987).
[Vol. 91
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petent, with reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of the job in question. ' 25 Finally, reasonable accommo-
dation includes "adjustments or modifications to the work assign-
ment or work environment to enable a handicapped person to fulfill
employment responsibilities. ' 26 This legislation and its definitions
provide the framework for analysis of a handicap employment dis-
crimination case.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Coffman the Board of Regents argued on appeal that Coff-
man was not a "qualified handicapped person" and therefore not
entitled to protection under the Human Rights Act. The Board's
theory was that in order to be qualified, Coffman must be able to
perform the essential duties of her position without reasonable ac-
commodations. The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected this theory
and relied instead on the state regulations, which say that "a qual-
ified handicapped person is 'one who is able and competent, with
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of
the job in question.' ,,27 The court seemed to adopt the United States
Supreme Court standard for review of the Federal Act, which was
established in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline.
28
Under Arline, the questions to be addressed are whether the plaintiff
is a "handicapped person" under the Act,29 and if so, whether she
is "otherwise qualified." The latter question is answered by assessing
whether she can perform the "essential functions" of her position
with "reasonable accommodation." 30 Finally, the court must con-
sider whether the accommodation imposes undue hardship on the
employer .31
25. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 4.2 (1987); see also 45 C.F.R. 84.3(k)(1) (1987).
26. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 4.3(a) (1987); see also 29 C.F.R. 1613 704(b)(2) (1987).
27. Coffman, No. 17904 at 6 (quoting 77 C.S.R. 1 § 4.2 (1987)) (emphasis supplied by the
Court). The application of the regulations in Coffman was at best inconsistent. The circuit court did
not apply the regulations. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court of Appeals used the regulations when they
supported the court's opinion. Id. at 4 n.4.
28. School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Coffman, No.
17904 at 6 n.8.
29. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1125.
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A. The Handicap Defined
In order to be protected under the Act, an individual's handicap
must be within the meaning of handicap in the applicable regula-
tions. These define handicap as "any physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life ac-
tivities." 32 Mere existence of an impairment is not enough; it must
be shown to affect a "major life activity," which includes em-
ployment.33 The language of the regulations allows some flexibility
for the court applying them to a particular case. 34 While many phys-
ical impairments such as hearing loss, knee injuries, visual impair-
ment and epilepsy have been found to be covered handicaps, 35 others
such as left-handedness, chronic lateness and excessive weight have
not been accepted by the courts. 6
In Arline a teacher claimed that a disease, tuberculosis, caused
her handicap. 37 The United States Supreme Court looked at how
the disease had affected her life-frequency of occurrence, hospi-
talization, and absence from work-to determine whether the im-
pairment limited a major life activity.38 The court found that
tuberculosis had affected Arline's ability to work and held that the
disease caused her to be handicapped within the meaning of the
regulations .39
In deciding Coffman, the Supreme Court of Appeals did not
address the question of whether the plaintiff's impairment was a
handicap. While portions of the record cited throughout the opinion
indicate that Coffman's back injury did affect her employment (a
major life activity), 40 the court did not address whether Coffman
32. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 2.1 (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 Ci) (1987).
33. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 2.5 (1987); 45 C.F.R. 84.3 (j)(2)(ii) (1987).
34. Note, supra note 6, at 999.
35. Southeast Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Trimble v. Carlin, 633 F.
Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 318 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1982).
36. De Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th. Cir. 1986); School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Fried-
man, 96 Pa. Commw. 267, 507 A.2d 882 (1986); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d
793 (N.D. 1987).
37. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
38. Id. at 1127.
39. Id.
40. Coffman, No. 17904 at 1-3.
[Vol. 91
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was handicapped because neither party challenged the finding on
appeal.41 The court merely defined handicap under the regulations
and continued its analysis by proceeding to the next question, which
was whether Coffman was "otherwise qualified" and entitled to
protection under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.42
B. "Otherwise Qualified" Defined
Handicap alone does not qualify as a protected trait in em-
ployment discrimination. In order to be entitled to equal opportunity
protection, the handicapped person must also be "otherwise qual-
ified."' 43 This is defined by the regulations as being able to perform
the essential functions of the position with reasonable accommo-
dation.44
To determine whether the handicapped person is otherwise qual-
ified, two questions must be answered: 1) what are the "essential
functions" of the position, and 2) what reasonable accommodation
might enable the handicapped person to perform these essential
functions .45
1. Determining Essential Functions
The first United States Supreme Court interpretation of essential
functions was Southeast Community College v. Davis, in which a
deaf nursing student challenged her exclusion from a federally-funded
nursing program.46 While holding that Davis was not entitled to
protection because she could not meet all of the program's require-
ments, 47 the court stated in dicta that "situations may arise where
a refusal to modify . . . might become unreasonable and discrim-
inatory. ' 48 The response of the lower courts to 'Davis has been di-
41. Id. at 13 n.16.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Davis, 442 U.S. at 405.
44. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 4.2 (1987).
45. Id.
46. Davis, 442 U.S. at 397.
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id. at 412-13.
1989]
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vided. Some courts have followed the holding, have required all the
essential functions to be met, and have thus limited the affirmative
duties to the handicapped. 49 Others have limited the holding to the
facts of Davis and have followed its dicta by allowing for a "zone
of marginal incapacity which the employer must either tolerate or
accommodate." 50 This view gives more flexibility to oblige the hand-
icapped.
The United States Supreme Court did not clarify this duality
when it decided Arline because the case was remanded on the ques-
tion of whether Ariline was "otherwise qualified." ' 5' The Court did
give some guidelines. It required an individualized inquiry into the
possible contagiousness of the disease.12 While the Court noted that
under Davis the handicapped person must meet "all the require-
ments," it tempered this in the employment context by noting that
the lower court must consider whether reasonable accommodation
by the employer would enable the handicapped employee to perform
the essential functions of the job.53
In examining the essential duties in Coffman, the Supreme Court
of Appeals listed the duties of a Custodian I in a footnote. These
include sweeping, mopping and scrubbing, cleaning bathrooms, re-
moving garbage, changing beds, setting up chairs and displays, re-
moving snow and ice and requisitioning materials.54 Although the
record indicated that the job description of a Custodian I "was
intended to serve as a generic . . . design of all Custodian I Light
Duty positions throughout the university . . . [and] was not a po-
sition description specifying the individual duties" that each Cus-
todian I must fulfill,5 5 the court found that anything less than all
the listed duties would not fulfill the essential functions require-
ment.56 Thus, Coffman's ability to perform only the "high work"
49. Note, supra note 6, at 1009 n.76.
50. Id. at 1009 n.77, 1011.
51. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1131 n.17.
54. Coffman, No. 17904 at 7-8 n.9.
55. Id. at 7 (Miller, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 11.
[Vol. 91
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led to a failure to meet all the essential functions.17 This interpre-
tation closely resembles Davis.
The dissent in Coffman relied on two cases which follow the
dicta of Davis. The first case, Simon v. St. Louis County, Missouri,
involved a police officer's challenge of his dismissal after a gunshot
wound left him partially paralyzed.5 8 The Simon court stated that
the essential functions as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in Davis should be the "legitimate physical requirements" of
the position .5 9 Due to evidence that the police department's require-
ments were not all necessary or required of all officers, the court
remanded for further finding of whether Simon could perform the
essential functions of the desk job he was assigned 0
The second case, Ackerman v. Western Electric Co., Inc., was
a challenge by an asthmatic installer to dismissal because of health
restrictions on her job performance. 61 The Ackerman court's analysis
of the specific duties of an installer revealed that, because of lifting
and dust restrictions, the employee was unable to perform 11.5%
of her required duties. 6 However, because of the nature of the work
crew, reassignment of this portion of her duties was reasonable ac-
commodation. 63 Her ability to perform 88.5% of the essential duties
was sufficient to meet the "otherwise qualified" requirement.
Following the dicta in Davis, the dissent to Coffman would find
the essential functions requirement to be met, either as in Simon,
by looking only to the essential functions of the "high work" po-
sition (a voluntary accommodation by the employer), 64 or as in Ack-
erman, by allowing part of the essential duties to be transferred to
another person in the crew.
65
57. Id. at 12.
58. Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
976 (1982).
59. Id. at 320 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 406).
60. Id. at 321.
61. Ackerman v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 860
F.2d 1514 (912 Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 845-46.
63. Id. at 847-48.
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2. Reasonable Accommodations
The second step in deciding whether a handicapped person is
"otherwise qualified" is to determine whether any reasonable ac-
commodation would enable him or her to perform the essential func-
tions of the position. The West Virginia regulations define
"reasonable accommodation" as adjustments or modifications to
the work assignment or work environment to enable a handicapped
person to perform the essential functions. 66 These adjustments in-
clude 1) making the work area accessible, 2) modifying equipment,
3) restructuring the job and modifying work schedules, 4) training,
5) adaptive aides and 6) educating other employees to adjust to the
handicapped employee.
67
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has offered little
guidance on reasonable accommodation. In Davis the Court held
that no accommodation need be made because Davis could not meet
all of the requirements of the program and therefore was not "oth-
erwise qualified. ' 68 Arline was remanded for further findings of fact
to determine whether the employee could be accommodated. 69 How-
ever, the Arline Court did offer some guidance in a footnote:
Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation
for a handicapped employee. Although they are not required to find another job
for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot
deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available un-
der the employer's existing policies.-
This footnote has been interpreted by the federal courts to either
prohibit or require transfer as a part of reasonable accommodation.
The discussion of reasonable accommodation by the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Coffman is also limited to a
footnote.71 The court noted Coffman's restrictions in bending and
lifting and concluded that "[w]hile modifications such as long-han-
66. 77 C.S.R. I § 4.3 (1987).
67. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b) (1987).
68. Davis, 442 U.S. at 407.
69. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
70. Id. at 1131 n.10.
71. Coffman, No. 17904 at 8 n.10.
[Vol. 91
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dled tools may have enabled Coffman to perform duties which re-
quired bending, we cannot envision, and Coffman has not suggested,
any type of reasonable modification which would have accommo-
dated her lifting restrictions." 72 The Supreme Court of Appeals then
examined the unit position (in which Coffman performed the "high
work" while a partner performed the "low work") from which
Coffman was dismissed. The court concluded that this position was
a transfer73 and proceeded to question whether reasonable accom-
modation includes a duty to transfer. The court did not address the
fact that the reassignment to the unit position was voluntarily made
by the hospital to accommodate Coffman's restrictions. 74 The Su-
preme Court of Appeals also overlooked the West Virginia regu-
lation which imposes a higher duty to accommodate employees who
become handicapped during the course of employment by allowing
the accommodation to include alternative employment opportunities
reasonably available under the employer's existing policies. 75 Under
this regulation, Coffman should have been able to remain in the
position in which the hospital last placed her. However, in the ab-
sence of West Virginia precedent, the court looked to federal de-
cisions to determine whether a transfer should be considered a
reasonable accommodation. 76 The court cited five decisions in which
the handicapped employee alleged that the employer's duty to ac-
commodate included either reassignment, rewriting job descriptions,
or permanent transfer. 77 All the decisions said that there was no
duty to transfer or reassign in order to provide reasonable accom-
modation for a handicapped employee.78 The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals adopted these cases as persuasive precedent and held that
reasonable accommodation did not include a duty to transfer. 79 Be-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 3.
75. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 4.7 (1987).
76. Coffman, No. 17904 at 8.
77. Alderson v. Postmaster General, 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1984); Carty v. Carlin, 623
F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985); Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481 ,V.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 831
F.2d 298 (1987); Bento v. ITO Corp. of Rhode Island, 599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.I. 1984); Carter v.
Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
78. Alderson, 598 F. Supp. at 55; Carty, 623 F. Supp. at 1188; Wimbley, 642 F. Supp. at 486;
Bento, 599 F. Supp. at 745; Carter, 822 F.2d at 469.
79. Coffman, No. 17904 at 11.
1989]
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cause no other reasonable accommodation would enable Coffman
to perform the essential functions of a Custodian I, the hospital did
not violate the Human Rights Act in discharging herY°
In adopting this precedent, the Supreme Court of Appeals over-
looked two problems. First, unlike Coffman, all five of the federal
cases it cited involved a collective bargaining agreement which lim-
ited transfer to light duty for at least the first five years of em-
ployment.8 1 Second, these cases do not represent the exclusive
interpretation of the courts; there are other courts which have held
that there is a duty to transfer under reasonable accommodation. 2
For instance, American Federation of Government Employees, Local
51 v. Baker involved five handicapped employees who were notified
that they would be discharged after the employer instituted changes
in job structuring which resulted in their inability to work up to
requirements." In this case the district court interpreted Arline's
dicta as creating an affirmative obligation of the employer to ac-
commodate handicapped employees. 4 The employer was ordered to
retain the employees until a rehabilitation specialist could select ac-
commodations according to each employee's needs.85
While the Coffman decision is not unreasonable according to the
precedent adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals, it is not in
line with the state regulation which applies to employees who become
handicapped during the course of their employment.8 6 Considering
the regulations and the voluntary nature of the accommodation in
question, the court should have required the hospital to show undue
hardship in order to dismiss Coffman once the accommodation was
made.
80. Id. at 12.
81. Carter, 822 F.2d at 467; Alderson, 598 F. Supp. at 55; Carty, 623 F. Supp. at 1189;
Wimbley, 642 F. Supp. at 487; Bento, 599 F. Supp. at 745.
82. Ignacio v. U.S. Postal Service, 30 M.S.P.R. 471 (Spec. Pan. 1986); Rhone v. U.S. Dept.
of the Army, 665 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Trimble v. Carlin, 633 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa.
1986); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 51 v. James Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
83. American Fed'n. of Gov't Employees, Local 51 v. James Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
84. Id. at 638.
85. Id. at 639.
86. 77 C.S.R. I § 4.7 (1987).
[Vol. 91
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Once a handicapped employee has established that he was dis-
missed despite being able to perform the essential functions of a
position with reasonable accommodation, he has established a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. The employer has one re-
maining defense-if he can show that the accommodation causes
undue hardship or safety concerns he may overcome this duty to
accommodate. 87 This is an affirmative defense which must be raised
by the employer."
Guidance from the United States Supreme Court is again only
dicta. In Davis the Court suggested that accommodation is not rea-
sonable if it imposes "undue financial and administrative burdens"
on a grantee (referring to federal programs). 89 In Arline the Court
cited Davis on the issue of undue hardship" and suggested that safety
factors must be considered when the employer is subject to public
health regulations.91
Other lower courts have addressed this affirmative defense. In
Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission92 the employer alleged
that he discharged an epileptic cafeteria employee because of safety
concerns in operating equipment such as deep fryers and meat sli-
cers. After closely examining the facts, the Iowa court found that
while employees were required to be able to perform a variety of
functions, the discharged employee's actual position did not include
any of the alleged dangerous activities. Therefore, employee safety
was an insufficient defense. 93 The Ackerman case addressed both
the safety and undue hardship defense. 94 The employer alleged that
because of the employee's asthma, it was hazardous to allow her
to work in high dust conditions. 95 The court found that these con-
87. 77 C.S.R. 1 §§ 4.4, 4.3(b) (1987); 29 C.F.R. 1613.704(a) (1987).
88. 77 C.S.R. 1 § 4.9 (1987).
89. Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.
90. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17.
91. Id. at 1131-32.
92. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Right Comm'n, 318 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1982).
93. Id. at 169.
94. Ackerman, 643 F. Supp. at 848, 851.
95. Id. at 848.
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ditions were not common and that a paper mask (suggested by the
employee's physician) would eliminate the danger.9 6 The employer
also alleged that the reassignment of 11.5% of the employee's duties
would impose undue hardship.97 Absent evidence to support this
claim, the court also struck down this defense. 98
Undue hardship was not addressed by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Coffman. The court held that, because Coffman
was unable to perform the essential functions of a Custodian I, the
hospital did not violate the Act. 99 Coffman was, therefore, unable
to establish a prima facie case and the burden did not shift to her
employer to show undue hardship to overcome the duty to accom-
modate. No balancing of undue hardship was required to reach this
conclusion.
C. Workers' Compensation Exclusion
The Supreme Court of Appeals seems to suggest that because
Coffman was eligible for Workers' Compensation benefits, she was
ineligible for protection under the Human Rights Act. The court
noted that: -,
[t]he intent of the legislature inherent in the enacting of the handicapped pro-
visions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act was to assure equal opportunities
for the handicapped in housing and employment. Thus, we cannot conclude that
the legislature intended the handicapped provisions of the . . . Act as an alter-
native source of compensation for injuries sustained on the job (citation omit-
ted). 10
The dissent, however, said that it was "outrageously fallacious" for
the court to imply that the Workers' Compensation Act precluded
any recovery under the Human Rights Act. 10
The purpose of Workers' Compensation benefits is to provide
compensation for medical treatment and lost wages due to work-
96. Id. at 850.
97. Id. at 851.
98. Id.
99. Coffman, No. 17904 at 13.
100. Id. at 13-14 n.16.
101. Id. at 15 (Miller, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 91
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/9
COFFMAN v. REGENTS
related injuries,102 as well as for impairment of earning capacity when
the injury results in permanent disability. 1°3 By contrast, the Human
Rights Act provides a cause of action for discrimination suffered
by the handicapped person. 1°4 The dissent points out that the Act
is consistent with W. Va. Code § 23-5A-1, which prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees because they have applied for
Workers' Compensation benefits.
10 5
Other state courts have addressed this combination of claims and
held that it is not a double recovery. 0 6 Reese v. Sears, Roebuck
Co. 07 involved the consolidation of two cases. Each case involved
both work-related injuries for which compensation benefits were
sought and allegations of discrimination under Washington's "Law
Against Discrimination.' 0 °8 The court held that the plaintiffs did
not receive a double recovery and that there was no bar to pursuing
both claims. The employees had suffered two separate injuries. 0 9
The Workers' Compensation benefits were a remedy for the harm
suffered by the injured employee (medical bills and lost wages), 10
and the discrimination act was a remedy for the subsequent injury
of discriminatory discharge."' In the event that the employee's suit
for discriminatory discharge was successful, any wage benefits re-
ceived after the date of discharge for worker's compensation could
be deducted from the amount of the discrimination award."2 It should
therefore not be necessary to elect to pursue only one of the claims,
and the Supreme Court of Appeals should not assume that Workers'
102. Cropp v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 621, 236 S.E.2d 480 (1977);
Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 58, 232 S.E.2d 343 (1977).
103. Posey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 157 W. Va. 285, 201 S.E.2d 102 (1973).
104. Coffman, No. 17904 at 16-17. (Miller, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 17 (Miller, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 17-18 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citing Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 420
Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984) (superseded by statute as stated in Eide v. Kelsey - Hayes Company,
431 Mich. 26, 27-30, 427 N.W.2d 488, 489-90 (1988)); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wash.
2d 363, 731 P.2d 497 (1987); Jones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 794,
244 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1988).
107. Reese. 107 Wash. 2d 563, 731 P.2d 497 (1987).
108. Id. at 566-67, 731 P.2d at 499, 500.
109. Id. at 568-69, 731 P.2d at 501-502.
110. Id. at 568, 731 P.2d at 500-01.
111. Id. at 569-70, 731 P.2d at 501.
112. Id. at 574, 731 P.2d at 503.
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Compensation will provide a safety net in handicapped discrimi-
nation cases.
V. CONCLUSION
In its three to two decision in Coffman, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals gives the first interpretation of the West
Virginia Human Rights Act as it applies to handicapped persons.
The court narrowly interprets the Act and holds that an employee
must be able to perform all the essential functions of a position
with reasonable accommodation. This accommodation does not in-
clude a transfer."13 Furthermore, the court assumes that Workers'
Compensation should provide a safety net ' 4 and refuses to extend
protection to workers who become disabled on the job. The courts,
however, should not have viewed the receipt of Workers' Compen-
sation benefits as a bar to a handicapped discrimination claim be-
cause the injury and the discharge are two separate harms. A more
moderate standard is suggested under the regulations, which favor
a stronger duty to accommodate an employee who becomes hand-
icapped on the job." 5 A job reassignment requiring little or no re-
training should be considered a reasonable accommodation rather
than a transfer. This would allow disabled workers to overcome their
acquired handicap and to remain self-supporting rather than being
forced to rely on society for support. The Legislature enacted the
Human Rights Act to open the door to gainful employment for the
handicapped; the Coffman decision frustrates that intent.
Michele W. Good
113. Coffman, No. 17904 at 13.
114. Id. at 13-14 n.16.
115. 77 C.S.R. I § 4.7 (1987).
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